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Introduction 
Nationwide class actions have played a significant role in the U.S. 
legal system.1 When a company participates in misconduct that affects 
a large group of people, the class action is one of the best vehicles for 
vindicating that group’s rights.2 Due to recent developments in 
personal-jurisdiction jurisprudence, the class-action device is being 
threatened with a blow that would severely limit its application. To 
best understand, consider the following hypothetical: Hurricane Katrina 
decimated much of the lower eastern quarter of the United States. 
Massive rebuilding efforts—and the Florida housing bubble—caused 
drywall to be in short supply.3 To fix the shortage, drywall from China 
was imported to the U.S. and used in homes throughout the coastal 
states.4 Not long after installation, the drywall began to give off 
unpleasant odors, corrode wiring, and cause homeowners to feel 
physically ill.5 Imagine a Florida resident has been adversely affected 
by the use of the drywall in her home. Meanwhile, a class action based 
on the same grievances as our Florida resident is filed in a Louisiana 
federal court and passes the certification process. Assume the Florida 
resident is one of several thousand unnamed plaintiffs in the class action 
from out of state. The defendant moves to dismiss for lack of personal 
jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2).6 After 
Bristol-Myer Squibb Co. v. Superior Court7 (“BMS”)—holding that a 
California court lacked personal jurisdiction over out-of-state-plaintiff 
claims in a mass-tort action—should the federal court grant the motion 
to dismiss? 
In her dissenting opinion in BMS, Justice Sotomayor made clear 
that the Supreme Court did not reach the question of whether its ruling 
applied to class actions.8 And after BMS, federal courts are split on the 
issue. Out of 104 cases, fifty federal courts have held that BMS extends 
 
1. Daniel Wilf-Townsend, Did Bristol-Myers Squibb Kill the Nationwide Class 
Action?, 129 Yale L.J.F. 205, 206 (2019). 
2. Id. 
3. Contaminated Drywall: Examining the Current Health, Housing and 
Product Safety Issues Facing Homeowners: Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on Consumer Prot., Prod. Safety, and Ins. of the S. Comm. on Com., Sci., 
and Transp., 112th Cong. 2 (2011) (statement of Sen. Roger F. Wicker). 
4. Id. 
5. Id. 
6. See, e.g., In re Chinese Manufactured Drywall Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 09-
2047, 2017 WL 5971622, at *1–3 (E.D. La. Nov. 30, 2017). Facts proposed 
in the hypothetical are loosely based on the facts of this case. 
7. 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017). 
8. Id. at 1789 n.4 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
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to class actions, forty did not reach a holding, and fourteen held that 
BMS does not extend to class actions.9 Some have argued that the 
question is not whether BMS applies to class actions but rather how it 
applies.10 Rather than examining each and every context in which a 
class action may arise in federal court and altering the analysis 
accordingly, this Note endorses a simpler resolution to the problem: 
BMS does not apply to unnamed plaintiffs in class actions in federal 
court because absent class members are not parties to the lawsuit for 
personal-jurisdiction purposes.11 
The non-party approach was previously affirmed by the Supreme 
Court with regard to subject matter jurisdiction in class actions, and 
the rationale the Court applied for doing so applies equally in the 
personal-jurisdiction context.12 Moreover, the non-party approach to 
personal jurisdiction in class actions has been adopted by several federal 
district courts as well as a federal court of appeals.13 Failure to apply 
this rule would be contrary to judicial efficiency and conflict with ease 
of administration—two of the core purposes of the class device.14 While 
this Note assumes that BMS likely applies to named plaintiffs, cate–
gorizing absent class members as non-parties significantly diminishes 
BMS’s effects on class actions. Under this approach, the out-of-state 
status of an unnamed plaintiff would be irrelevant. As a result, all the 
plaintiff class would need to do to satisfy personal jurisdiction would 
be to file the action in a federal court in any state,15 a federal court in 
 
9. Wilf-Townsend, supra note 1, at 212–13. 
10. Id. at 208. 
11. Throughout the remainder of this Note, I will refer to this as the “non-
party approach” or “the non-party rule.” 
12. See Devlin v. Scardelleti, 536 U.S. 1, 10 (2002). In Devlin, the Court 
reasoned: 
The rule that nonnamed class members cannot defeat complete 
diversity is likewise justified by the goals of class litigation. Ease of 
administration of class actions would be compromised by having to 
consider the citizenship of all class members, many of whom may 
even be unknown, in determining jurisdiction. Perhaps more 
importantly, considering all class members for these purposes would 
destroy diversity in almost all class actions. Nonnamed class 
members are, therefore, not parties in that respect.  
 Id. (citation omitted). 
13. See Al Haj v. Pfizer, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 3d 815, 820 (N.D. Ill. 2018); Jones 
v. Depuy Synthes Prods., Inc., 330 F.R.D. 298, 311 (N.D. Ala. 2018); see 
also Mussat v. IQVIA Inc., 953 F.3d 441, 447 (7th Cir. 2020), cert. 
denied, 141 S. Ct. 1126 (2021). 
14. Al Haj, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 822. 
15. This is when the Fifth Amendment applies for personal jurisdiction. See 
infra Part I.B.2.b. 
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a state to which the named plaintiff has a connection, or a state where 
the defendant is incorporated or has its principal place of business.16 
Part I of this Note discusses modern personal-jurisdiction juris–
prudence and highlights recent developments in the law. Part II gives 
an overview of BMS and a brief description of class actions, detailing 
the certification process and describing a major difference between class 
actions and mass tort actions. Part III introduces the non-party 
approach and its application in other areas of class actions, and explains 
why it should be extended to personal jurisdiction. Lastly, Part IV 
responds to common arguments against applying the non-party rule to 
personal jurisdiction in class actions. 
I. Personal Jurisdiction Today 
The modern era of the personal-jurisdiction doctrine began in 1945 
with the landmark case of International Shoe Co. v. Washington.17 In 
International Shoe, the Court abandoned the territorial sovereignty 
theory to focus solely on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.18 In doing so, the Court developed the well-known 
minimum contacts test used for specific jurisdiction today.19 
Since International Shoe was decided in 1945, the personal 
jurisdiction doctrine has gone through many changes. The two cases 
that have attracted the most attention recently—BMS and Daimler AG 
v. Bauman20—were decided by the Supreme Court in 2017 and 2014, 
respectively. While Daimler concerned issues of general personal 
jurisdiction and BMS addressed specific personal jurisdiction, both 
cases narrowed the circumstances in which courts can exercise personal 
jurisdiction over defendants. To best understand the current state of 
both specific and general personal jurisdiction, it is best to analyze each 
separately. 
 
16. These latter two are when the Fourteenth Amendment applies. See infra 
Part I.B.2.a. 
17. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). See also Austen L. Parrish, Sovereignty, Not Due 
Process: Personal Jurisdiction Over Nonresident Alien Defendants, 41 
Wake Forest L. Rev. 1, 12 (2006) (describing International Shoe as “the 
fountainhead of modern personal jurisdiction doctrine”). 
18. Parrish, supra note 17, at 12.  
19. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (“[D]ue process requires only that in order to 
subject a defendant to a judgement in personam, if he be not present within 
the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such 
that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair 
play and substantial justice.’” (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 
(1940))). See infra Part I.B. 
20. 571 U.S. 117 (2014). 
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A. General Personal Jurisdiction 
General personal jurisdiction allows a court to hear “any and all 
claims” against a foreign defendant regardless of whether those claims 
arose from the defendant’s in-state activity.21 Prior to 2014, the general 
personal jurisdiction analysis was primarily “contact-based.”22 The 
theory was that if a defendant had “continuous and systematic 
contacts” in the forum state, then general personal jurisdiction over the 
defendant was warranted.23 In 2014, the Supreme Court threw a wrench 
in the general personal jurisdiction framework in its decision in 
Daimler.24 Now, for general personal jurisdiction to exist, the defendant 
must be “at home” in the forum state, or in other words, the forum 
state must be the defendant’s state of incorporation or where its 
principal place of business is located.25 
B. Specific Personal Jurisdiction 
A court that lacks general personal jurisdiction may still have 
specific personal jurisdiction over a party. Unlike general personal 
jurisdiction, specific jurisdiction does not allow a court to hear any and 
all claims against the defendant. Instead, the plaintiff’s claims must 
arise out of the defendant’s in-forum activity.26 
The specific personal jurisdiction analysis is a multi-step framework 
that varies depending on whether a case is in state or federal court. The 
first step of the analysis, however, is usually the same regardless of the 
forum. That is, courts will determine whether the exercise of personal  
21. Foreign in this context refers to a defendant from either a different state or 
foreign country. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 
U.S. 915, 919 (2011) (defining foreign as “sister-state or foreign country”). 
22. Id. (“A court may assert general jurisdiction over foreign . . . corporations 
to hear any and all claims against them when their affiliations with the 
State are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them essentially at 
home in the forum State.” (quoting Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317)). 
23. Id. at 922 (citation omitted). 
24. 571 U.S. at 138–39. 
25. Id. at 137, 139. 
26. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985). The Court 
explained: 
Where a forum seeks to assert specific jurisdiction over an out-of-
state defendant who has not consented to suit there, [the] “fair 
warning” requirement is satisfied if the defendant has “purposefully 
directed” his activities at residents of the forum, and the litigation 
results from alleged injuries that “arise out of or relate to” those 
activities.  
 Id. (footnote omitted) (first quoting Keeton v. Hustler Mag., Inc., 465 U.S. 
770, 774 (1984); and then quoting Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, 
S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984)). 
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jurisdiction in a case is authorized by the appropriate legislative body.27 
If a court finds that personal jurisdiction was authorized, the court 
must then determine “whether the exercise of jurisdiction ‘comports 
with the limits imposed by . . . due process.’”28 
1. Authorization by the Appropriate Legislative Body 
To determine whether Congress authorized the exercise of personal 
jurisdiction in a particular instance, federal courts will look to either 
the federal statute under which the claim arises or the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure.29 Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
governs personal jurisdiction in federal court.30 Under Rule 4(k), there 
are several ways a federal court can establish jurisdiction over a 
defendant. First, federal courts may exercise jurisdiction over defen–
dants who are subject to personal jurisdiction in the state in which the 
federal court sits through service of process or the filing of a waiver of 
service.31 If a case is in state court the state’s long-arm statute dictates 
whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction is appropriate.32 Some 
states have liberal long-arm statutes that confer jurisdiction to the full 
extent authorized by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. For example, California’s long-arm statute provides that 
“[a] court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not 
inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United 
States.”33 Other states may take a more restrictive approach, limiting 
the scenarios where jurisdiction exists. New York is an example of a 
state that has a long-arm statute that is more limited in scope.34 
 
27. If it is a federal question case in federal court, courts will look to the federal 
statute under which the claim arises or more generally the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A). If the case is in state 
court, courts will look to the state’s long-arm statute. See Walden v. Fiore, 
571 U.S. 277, 283 (2014) (looking first to Nevada’s statutory law to deter–
mine to what extent it authorizes personal jurisdiction over defendants). 
28. Walden, 571 U.S. at 283 (quoting Daimler, 571 U.S. at 125). 
29. See 4 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice 
and Procedure § 1069 (4th ed. 2019). 
30. See id. 
31. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A) (“Serving a summons or filing a waiver of 
service establishes personal jurisdiction over a defendant . . . who is subject 
to the jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction in the state where the 
district court is located.”). 
32. See 4 Wright & Miller, supra note 29, § 1069. 
33. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 410.10 (West 2019). 
34. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302 (McKinney 2008). The statute provides:  
As to a cause of action arising from any of the acts enumerated in 
this section, a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any non-
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Another way for a federal court to establish personal jurisdiction 
over a defendant is under Rule 4(k)(2), which provides that a federal 
court has personal jurisdiction in a federal question case if “the 
defendant is not subject to jurisdiction in any state’s courts of general 
jurisdiction; and exercising jurisdiction is consistent with the United 
States Constitution and laws.”35 
The last way for a federal court to establish jurisdiction over a 
defendant is if the assertion of jurisdiction was authorized by Congress 
in the statute giving rise to the cause of action.36 For example, the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) authorizes 
jurisdiction in “the district where the plan is administered, where the 
breach took place, or where a defendant resides or may be found, and 
process may be served in any other district where a defendant resides 
or may be found.”37 
2. Due Process Standards 
Legislative authorization to exercise personal jurisdiction over a 
particular defendant alone is insufficient. The exercise of jurisdiction 
must also comport with constitutional due-process requirements. The 
due-process standard that applies differs depending on the case. The 
 
domiciliary, or his executor or administrator, who in person or 
through an agent:  
1. transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to 
supply goods or services in the state; or  
2. commits a tortious act within the state, except as to a cause of 
action for defamation of character arising from the act; or  
3. commits a tortious act without the state causing injury to person 
or property within the state, except as to a cause of action for 
defamation of character arising from the act, if he  
(i) regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other 
persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from 
goods used or consumed or services rendered, in the state, or  
(ii) expects or should reasonably expect the act to have 
consequences in the state and derives substantial revenue from 
interstate or international commerce; or  
4. owns, uses or possesses any real property situated within the 
state. 
 Id. 
35. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2). 
36. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(C) (“Serving a summons or filing a waiver of 
service establishes personal jurisdiction over a defendant . . . when author–
ized by a federal statute.”). 
37. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(2) (2012). 
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key determination is whether the Fifth or the Fourteenth Amendment 
governs. 
a. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process 
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment controls 
the personal jurisdiction analysis when: (1) the case is in state court; 
(2) the case is heard by a federal court sitting in diversity jurisdiction 
applying state law; or (3) the federal statute under which the claim is 
brought does not authorize personal jurisdiction.38 
Minimum Contacts, Purposeful Availment, and Connection 
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, for a court to exercise specific 
personal jurisdiction over a defendant, the defendant first must have 
“contacts, ties, or relations” in the forum.39 This is often referred to as 
the minimum-contacts requirement.40 Predicting whether a defendant 
has sufficient contact with a forum to satisfy this test can be difficult, 
as the Supreme Court itself has struggled to give a clear answer as to 
exactly what constitutes minimum contacts.41 Ultimately, the inquiry 
is highly fact-specific and will vary from case to case. 
The presence of minimum contacts alone, however, is not sufficient 
to support personal jurisdiction. The defendant must also have 
purposefully availed itself to the forum—a requirement which is said to 
“ensure[] that a defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as 
a result of ‘random,’ ‘fortuitous,’ or ‘attenuated’ contacts, or of the 
‘unilateral activity of another party or third person.’”42 Purposeful 
availment occurs when a defendant has “deliberately . . . engaged in 
significant activities within a State, or has created ‘continuing 
obligations’ between himself and residents of the forum.”43 
 
38. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k). See also 4 Wright & Miller, supra note 29, § 
1064. 
39. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945). 
40. See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985) (“Once 
it has been decided that a defendant purposefully established minimum 
contacts . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
41. See, e.g., Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 227–28 (1977) (Brennan, J, 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (disagreeing with the majority’s 
approach to a minimum-contacts analysis). 
42. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475 (first quoting Keeton v. Hustler Mag., Inc., 
465 U.S. 770, 773–74 (1984); then quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. 
v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 299 (1979); and then quoting Helicopters 
Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 417 (1984)). 
43. Id. at 475–76 (first quoting Keeton, 465 U.S. at 781; and then quoting 
Travelers Health Ass’n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 648 (1950)). 
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Lastly, the claims brought against a defendant must also arise from 
the defendant’s contacts within the state. In other words, there has to 
be a connection between the forum and underlying legal controversy 
that establishes jurisdiction.44 In BMS, the Court made it clear that this 
requirement could not be relaxed just because a defendant has extensive 
contacts within a state.45 Despite maintaining widespread business 
operations in the state, the out-of-state plaintiffs could not show a 
connection between their claims, the state, and Bristol Myers Squibb, 
and therefore the Court held that there was no jurisdiction.46 
 
Traditional Notions of Fair Play and Substantial Justice 
 
If a defendant is found to have purposefully established minimum 
contacts within a state and the plaintiff’s claims arise out of those 
contacts, courts then consider a number of other factors to decide 
whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with “traditional 
notions of fair play and substantial justice.”47 These factors include the 
“burden on the defendant[;] . . . the forum State’s interest in 
adjudicating the dispute; the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient 
and effective relief[;] . . . the interstate judicial system’s interest in 
obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and the shared 
interest of several States in furthering fundamental substantive social 
policies.”48 
b. Fifth Amendment Due Process Personal        
Jurisdiction Standards 
The Fifth Amendment, rather than the Fourteenth, controls the 
personal jurisdiction analysis in federal question cases in which: (1) the 
defendant is out of reach of any state’s long-arm statute; or (2) the 
federal statute under which the claim arises authorizes personal 
jurisdiction and nationwide service of process.49 In the absence of either, 
even if a case is in federal court, the Fourteenth Amendment applies.50 
 
44. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780 (2017). 
45. Id. at 1781 (rejecting a sliding-scale approach). 
46. Id. at 1779, 1781. 
47. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (quoting Miliken v. Meyer, 
311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). 
48. World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980) (citations 
omitted). 
49. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)–(2); 4 Wright & Miller, supra note 29, 
§ 1068.1. 
50. 4 Wright & Miller, supra note 29, § 1068.1.; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 
4(k)(1)(A) (making personal jurisdiction dependent on whether a state 
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What limitations the Fifth Amendment places on the ability of federal 
courts to assert personal jurisdiction over a defendant is a question that 
the Court left open in BMS51 and did not address on two other 
occasions.52 While lower courts have addressed the issue, they have 
reached varying conclusions as to what the Fifth Amendment personal-
jurisdiction framework looks like.53 
In federal question cases, the Fifth Amendment personal-
jurisdiction inquiry changes to a national-contacts test.54 For a federal 
court to exercise jurisdiction over a defendant under the national-
contacts test, the defendant must have minimum contacts in the United 
States.55 This analysis is similar to the requirements imposed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the key difference being that the scope is na–
tional rather than confined to the borders of an individual state.56 One 
unclear part of the Fifth Amendment personal-jurisdiction standard is 
what weight should be given to the fairness factors, if any.57 The fairness 
test incorporates notions from the Fourteenth Amendment iterated in 
International Shoe58, and allows the exercize of jurisdiction when: 
 
court of general jurisdiction could exercise jurisdiction under the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
51. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1784 (2017) 
(“[W]e leave open the question whether the Fifth Amendment imposes the 
same restrictions on the exercise of personal jurisdiction by a federal 
court.”). 
52. See Omni Cap. Int’l v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 102 n.5 (1987) 
(acknowledging the unsettled Fifth Amendment argument); Asahi Metal 
Indus. Co., v. Superior Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 113 n.* (1987) (“We have no 
occasion here to determine whether Congress could, consistent with the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, authorize federal court personal 
jurisdiction over . . . defendants based on the aggregate of national 
contacts, rather than on the contacts between the defendant and the State 
in which the federal court sits.”). 
53. Compare Saudi v. Northrop Grumman Corp., 427 F.3d 271, 275 (4th Cir. 
2005) (finding sufficient contacts constitutionally necessary for the exercise 
of a court’s jurisdiction under Rule 4(k)(2)), with Bally Gaming, Inc. v. 
Kappos, 789 F. Supp. 2d 41, 45 (D.D.C. 2011) (“[W]hen this Court derives 
its personal jurisdiction over a defendant from a federal statute’s nation–
wide-service-of-process provision, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment does not require that the defendant also have minimum 
contacts with this district.”). 




58. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317–19; see also 4 Wright 
& Miller, supra note 29, § 1068.1. 
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The combination of the federal interest in furthering fundamental 
social policies, the judicial system’s interest in the efficient 
resolution of controversies, the particular forum’s interest in 
adjudicating the dispute, and the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining 
convenient and effective relief outweigh the burden on the 
defendant.59 
For federal courts that use the fairness approach, personal 
jurisdiction will be upheld if the defendant has both minimum contacts 
in the United States and if doing so is consistent with traditional 
notions of “fair play and substantial justice.”60 For courts that do not 
incorporate the fairness approach under the Fifth Amendment, the 
personal-jurisdiction framework can be understood as due process 
allowing the assertion of jurisdiction so long as “the federal interest in 
furthering fundamental objectives or policies rises to a constitutional 
level.”61 
II. Overview of Bristol-Myers Squibb and              
Rule 23 Class Actions 
A. Bristol-Myers Squibb: The Beginning of a New Limitation 
BMS was a mass-tort action brought in a California state court 
based on a products-liability claim.62 The plaintiffs alleged that BMS’s 
drug Plavix adversely affected their health.63 Most of the 678 plaintiffs 
were not residents of California.64And while BMS had extensive business 
operations in the state, the out-of-state plaintiffs did not ingest or 
purchase Plavix in California and therefore had no connection to the 
state.65 The Court’s analysis in part focused on the burden placed on 
the defendant if forced to litigate the case in California.66 According to 
the Court, determining the burden on a defendant under the personal-
jurisdiction analysis is just as much about “territorial limitations on the 
power of the respective States” as it is not wanting to subject a 
defendant to “inconvenient or distant litigation.”67 
 
59. 4 Wright & Miller, supra note 29, § 1068.1. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. 
62. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1778 (2017).  
63. Id. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. at 1781.  
66. Id. at 1780. 
67. Id. (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958)). 
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In reaching its holding, the Court rejected what it referred to as a 
“sliding scale” approach used by the California Supreme Court.68 The 
California Supreme Court opined that the greater the defendant’s 
contacts in the state, the less need there was for a strong connection 
between the claims and the forum state.69 BMS employed over 400 
people, maintained six research, development and policymaking 
facilities, and enjoyed $1 billion in sales in California.70 Nevertheless, 
the Court held that there was no personal jurisdiction.71 The dispositive 
fact was the lack of connection between the nonresident plaintiffs’ 
claims and the forum.72 
It did not take long for the effects of BMS to trickle down to the 
lower courts. Hours after BMS was decided, a judge in St. Louis, 
Missouri, granted a mistrial in a wrongful death suit against Johnson 
& Johnson.73 The underlying claim was that Johnson & Johnson’s 
talcum powder caused ovarian cancer, which allegedly led to the deaths 
of all three plaintiffs.74 At trial, the plaintiffs were awarded $72 and $55 
million.75 But just after BMS was decided, Johnson & Johnson moved 
for a mistrial, claiming that the court lacked jurisdiction over the 
plaintiffs’ claims because two of the three plaintiffs were from out of 
state and did not use or purchase the talcum powder in Missouri.76 The 
plaintiffs argued that Johnson & Johnson sold the product in the state, 
so their claim related to the defendant’s contact in the forum.77 Because 
of BMS, however, the judge ruled in favor of Johnson & Johnson.78 
While the Johnson & Johnson case is a prime example of BMS’s effects  
68. Id. at 1781. 
69. Id. at 1778. 
70. Id. at 1786 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
71. Id. at 1783 (majority opinion). 
72. Id. at 1781 (“The mere fact that other plaintiffs were prescribed, obtained, 
and ingested Plavix in California—and allegedly sustained the same 
injuries as did the nonresidents—does not allow the State to assert specific 
jurisdiction over the nonresidents’ claims.”). 
73. Richard Levick, The Game Changes: Is Bristol-Myers Squibb the End of 
an Era?, Forbes (Jul. 11, 2017, 02:21 PM), https://www.forbes.com/ 
sites/richardlevick/2017/07/11/the-game-changes-is-bristol-myers-squibb 
-the-end-of-an-era/#18fabed32e83 [https://perma.cc/VRV7-MLJG]. 
74. Jane Akre, J&J Granted Mistrial in Latest Talc Case in MO., 
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on forms of joined representation that are very similar to mass actions, 
the question left open after BMS is in what other contexts outside of 
mass-tort actions does its holding apply. 
B. Rule 23 Class Actions 
The class-action device serves an important role in our legal system. 
The rationale for having such a form of legal representation is to 
efficiently resolve the claims of several individuals in a single action.79 
The idea is that by consolidating claims into a single action, courts can 
avoid repetitive litigation, inconsistent outcomes on claims based on 
related events, and provide relief for individuals who could not vindicate 
their rights in individual law suits.80 Before a case can move forward as 
a class action, the party seeking class treatment must file for class 
certification.81 
1. Four Types of Class Actions 
There are four different forms of classes under Rule 23.82 First, Rule 
23(b)(1)(A) classes are warranted when the adjudication of individual 
cases would result in “inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect 
to individual class members that would establish incompatible 
standards of conduct for the party opposing the class.”83 The purpose 
of Rule 23(b)(1)(A) is to shield the party opposing the class from 
inconsistent judgments.84 
Second, Rule 23(b)(1)(B) classes are appropriate when the adjud–
ication of individual cases would potentially result in “adjudications 
with respect to individual class members that, as a practical matter, 
would be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties 
to the individual adjudications or would substantially impair or impede 
their ability to protect their interests.”85 The text of the rule makes 
clear that the purpose of Rule 23(b)(1)(B) is to protect the members of 
the class.86 
 
79. 7A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice 
and Procedure § 1754 (3d ed. 2002 & Supp. 2020). 
80. Id. 
81. Libby Jelinek, The Applicability of the Federal Rules of Evidence at Class 
Certification, 65 UCLA L. Rev. 280, 282 (2018). 
82. Robert H. Klonoff, The Adoption of a Class Action Rule: Some Issues for 
Mississippi to Consider, 24 Miss. Coll. L. Rev. 261, 263 (2005). 
83. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(A). See also Klonoff, supra note 82, at 263. 
84. Klonoff, supra note 82, at 263. 
85. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(B). See also Klonoff, supra note 82, at 263. 
86. Klonoff, supra note 82, at 263. 
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Third, a Rule 23(b)(2) class is proper when the “party opposing the 
class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the 
class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief 
is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.”87 Rule 23(b)(2) classes 
are often used in civil rights cases and “other suits seeking primarily 
structural relief.”88 
Lastly, a Rule 23(b)(3) class is fitting in two situations. First, when 
“the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to class 
members predominate over any questions affecting only individual 
members,” and second, when the court determines that “a class action 
is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently 
adjudicating the controversy.”89 
Regardless of what type of class is appropriate under 23(b), the 
party seeking class status must first satisfy all the requirements in Rule 
23(a). Rule 23(a) states that there must be: (1) numerosity; (2) com–
monality; (3) typicality; and (4) adequacy.90 Numerosity requires that 
the plaintiff prove the class size is so large that joinder of all members 
would be impracticable.91 To prove commonality, plaintiffs must show 
that members’ claims include “questions of law or fact common to the 
class.”92 Typicality requires the plaintiff(s) to show that “the claims or 
defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or 
defenses of the class.”93 And adequacy requires the plaintiff(s) to 
demonstrate that the “representative parties will fairly and adequately 
protect the interests of the class.”94 If the proposed class can survive 
23(a), it must then fulfill the conditions of one of the three subcategories 
of 23(b).95 
2. Named and Unnamed Plaintiffs: Class Actions Distinguished        
from Mass Actions 
BMS began as eight separate actions that were eventually 
consolidated into a mass action tort lawsuit under section 404 of the 
 
87. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). See also Klonoff, supra note 82, at 263. 
88. Klonoff, supra note 82, at 263. 
89. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). See also Klonoff, supra note 82, at 263. 
90. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). 
91. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). 
92. Id. 
93. Id.  
94. Id. 
95. Id. 
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California Civil Procedure Code.96 In a section 404 mass action, there 
are no “absentee litigants,” or in other words, every plaintiff in the case 
is a named party.97 The effect of this is that “each joined plaintiff may 
make different claims requiring different responses.”98 Unlike mass 
actions, in class actions there are two categories of plaintiffs: the 
representatives of the class (named plaintiffs), and the absent class 
members (unnamed plaintiffs).99 Because of Rule 23(a)’s requirements, 
after certification, the defendant is presented with a “unitary, coherent 
claim to which it need respond only with a unitary, coherent defense.”100 
In several of the cases addressing the application of BMS to class 
actions, courts have focused on the distinction between the two, and 
rightfully so.101 
III. The Non-Party Approach 
At the time this Note is being written, the issue of whether BMS 
applies to class actions has come before two circuit courts of appeals. 
First, in Mussat v. IQVIA, the Seventh Circuit unanimously held that 
BMS does not apply to unnamed plaintiffs in class actions.102 That court 
took a similar position to the one argued in this Note—that unnamed 
class members should not be considered parties for personal-jurisdiction 
purposes.103 The court explained that considering only named plaintiffs 
for personal jurisdiction has always been the approach, and there is 
nothing to indicate that BMS changed anything with regard to class 
actions.104 The Supreme Court, in several cases involving nationwide 
class actions where the basis for personal jurisdiction was specific 
personal jurisdiction, did not raise a jurisdictional issue with regard to 
 
96. Mussat v. IQVIA, Inc., 953 F.3d 441, 446 (7th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 
S. Ct. 1126 (2021). 
97. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 404 (West 2019). 
98. Knotts v. Nissan N. Am. Inc., 346 F. Supp. 3d 1310, 1334 (D. Minn. 2018) 
99. 1 William B. Rubenstein, Newberg on Class Actions § 1:5 (5th ed. 
2020). 
100. Sanchez v. Launch Tech. Workforce Sols., L.L.C., 297 F. Supp. 3d 1360, 
1366 (N.D. Ga. 2018). 
101. See id.; Al Haj v. Pfizer, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 3d 815, 819 (N.D. Ill. 2018); 
Jones v. Depuy Synthes Prods., Inc., 330 F.R.D. 298, 311 (N.D. Ala. 
2018). 
102. 953 F.3d 441, 443 (7th Cir. 2020). 
103. Id. at 447. 
104. Id. at 445. 
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the unnamed class members’ claims.105 The Seventh Circuit also 
reasoned that it would be illogical to take a non-party approach for 
subject matter jurisdiction and venue in class actions, but not personal 
jurisdiction.106 
Meanwhile, in Molock v. Whole Foods Market Group, Inc., the D.C. 
Circuit declined to address whether BMS applied to class actions in 
federal court.107 Instead, the court held that because the class was not 
yet certified, a ruling on the merits of the defendant’s motion to dismiss 
the nonresident putative class members’ claims for lack of personal 
jurisdiction was premature because putative class members were not 
parties before the court.108 A dissenting judge concluded that BMS 
applies to class actions in federal court.109 The dissenter rejected the 
plaintiff’s argument that absent class members are not parties for the 
purposes of personal jurisdiction.110 He reasoned that for purposes of 
personal jurisdiction, “the party status of absent class members seems 
to . . . be irrelevant,” because “[a] court that adjudicates claims 
asserted on behalf of others in a class action exercises coercive power 
over a defendant just as much as when it adjudicates claims of named 
plaintiffs in a mass action.”111 
A. Judicial Affirmance of the Non-Party Rule in other                        
Class Action Contexts 
The notion that unnamed plaintiffs in certified class actions are 
parties to a litigation for some purposes and not others is by no means 
novel.112 In American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, the issue before 
the Court was whether unnamed plaintiffs were considered parties for 
the purpose of tolling the statute of limitations.113 Although the Court 
concluded that unnamed plaintiffs were parties for statute-of-limitation 
purposes, it did so because it said to rule otherwise would require every 
absent class member to intervene and preserve their claims and such a 
requirement would be inconsistent with Rule 23.114 
 
105. Id. (citing Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011); Phillips 
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985); and Califano v. Yamasaki, 
442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979)). 
106. Id. at 447. 
107. 952 F.3d 293, 306–07 (D.C. Cir. 2020). 
108. Id. at 295. 
109. Id. at 306 (Silberman, J., dissenting). 
110. Id. 
111. Id. at 307. 
112. Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 551 (1974). 
113. Id. at 540. 
114. Id. at 550. 
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Likewise, in Devlin v. Scardelletti, the Court reaffirmed that un–
named class members may be considered parties for some purposes and 
not for others and that the determination was context-specific and 
“justified by the goals of class action litigation.”115 The Court stated 
that unnamed plaintiffs are not considered parties with regard to 
diversity of citizenship because such a requirement would require courts 
to consider the citizenship of every class member, thereby defeating one 
of the main goals of class actions—“[e]ase of administration.”116 The 
Court also noted that considering the citizenship for all class members 
“would destroy diversity in almost all class actions” and render Rule 23 
unworkable.117 
Lower courts have also recognized that unnamed plaintiffs in class 
actions may be parties for certain purposes and not for others. For 
example, in Neale v. Volvo Cars of North America, LLC, the Third 
Circuit held that unnamed plaintiffs in class actions are not parties for 
Article III standing purposes.118 The court explained that class actions 
are a representative form of litigation and that the named plaintiffs are 
the parties seeking to invoke the court’s jurisdiction and are responsible 
for establishing jurisdiction.119 Additionally, in Appleton Electric Co. v. 
Advance-United Expressways, the Seventh Circuit held that absent 
class members are not required to establish venue because imposing 
such a requirement “would eliminate the use of the class-action route 
in all cases where a defendant class is appropriate.”120 
B. The Non-Party Rule Applied to Personal Jurisdiction: Judicial 
Efficiency and Ease of Administration 
Class actions serve as an “efficient and fair” way to solve legal 
claims once, rather than multiple times, avoiding “piecemeal liti–
gation.”121 It is also widely agreed that federal courts have an interest 
in discouraging repetitive litigation “not only within a single district 
but within the entire system.”122 Requiring every unnamed class 
 
115. 536 U.S. 1, 10 (2002). 
116. Id. 
117. Id. 
118. 794 F.3d 353, 367 (3d Cir. 2015) (“Quite simply, requiring Article III 
standing of absent class members is inconsistent with the nature of an action 
under Rule 23.”). 
119. Id. at 364. 
120. 494 F.2d 126, 140 (7th Cir. 1974) (quoting Rsch. Corp. v. Pfister Assoc. 
Growers, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 497, 501 (N.D. Ill. 1969)). 
121. Chicago Tchrs. Union, Local No. 1 v. Bd. of Educ. of Chicago, 797 F.3d 
426, 444 (7th Cir. 2015). 
122. Hargrave v. Oki Nursery, Inc., 646 F.2d 716, 720 (2d Cir. 1980). 
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member to be from the state, or have suffered an injury in the state, 
would destroy jurisdiction in almost all cases. This would essentially be 
the end of the class-action device, the inevitable result of which would 
be an increase in piecemeal litigation to resolve legal claims based on 
the same underlying issue. 
Similar to subject matter jurisdiction, forcing unnamed plaintiffs in 
class actions to satisfy the requirements for personal jurisdiction would 
also be inconsistent with another major policy justification behind 
Rule 23—ease of administration.123 If the non-party rule were rejected, 
courts would have to consider each individual class member’s 
connection to the forum in order to properly conduct the personal-
jurisdiction analysis.124 Such a task would be just as burdensome and 
inefficient as examining citizenship of each absent class member to 
determine whether complete diversity exists, an approach that the 
Supreme Court rejected in Devlin.125 
IV. Common Counterarguments to the                    
Non-Party Approach 
The non-party approach to personal jurisdiction in class actions has 
received some pushback from courts and legal commentators. The 
compilation of defenses below was gathered from articles, judicial 
opinions, and briefs filed in cases involving the application of BMS to 
class actions. 
A. What about Defendant’s Due Process Rights? 
The dissenting opinion in Molock stated that “[a] defendant is . . . 
entitled to due process protections—including limits on assertions of 
personal jurisdiction—with respect to all claims in a class action for 
which a judgment is sought.”126 Of course, defendants are not stripped 
of due process rights in a class action, including protection from overly 
broad assertions of personal jurisdiction. But once a class is certified, 
there are no longer any individual class-member claims. Certification 
means that “key elements of the claim, and the key defenses, are 
common to the class,”127 and as a result the defendant is presented with 
 
123. Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 10 (2002). 
124. This pertains to cases where the Fourteenth, rather than the Fifth, 
Amendment applies. 
125. Devlin, 536 U.S. at 10. 
126. Molock v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc., 952 F.3d 293, 307 (D.C. Cir. 2020) 
(Silberman, J., dissenting). 
127. Brief of Amicus Curiae American Association for Justice in Support of 
Plaintiff-Appellant and Reversal at 17, Mussat v. IQVIA, Inc., 953 F.3d 441 
(7th Cir. 2020) (No. 19-1204), 2019 WL 1422419. 
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a “unitary, coherent claim to which it need respond only with a unitary, 
coherent defense.”128 Under the non-party approach, the defendant can 
still challenge the exercize of personal jurisdiction with respect to the 
plaintiffs who are bringing that unitary claim, i.e., the named plaintiffs. 
This ensures that there is sufficient connection to the forum for the 
claim being brought and therefore the defendant’s due process rights 
are protected. This approach is consistent with other forms of litigation 
in which representatives of others sue in their own names.129 For 
example, in suits involving trustees, executors, or guardians, a court 
will examine personal jurisdiction with regard to the representative, not 
the person being represented.130 Therefore, requiring a rule where every 
absent class member must be examined for personal jurisdiction would 
be as “pointless as it is radical” because the defendant’s due process 
rights are already adequately protected in a class action by other class 
device features.131 
When a defendant’s due process rights are already protected by 
other requirements set forth in Rule 23, courts have been hesitant to 
create new rules. For example, in Mullins v. Direct Digital LLC, the 
Seventh Circuit rejected the application of a heightened “ascer–
tainability” requirement in class actions.132 The defendants in Mullins 
argued that such a requirement would allow defendants in class action 
to “challenge the reliability of evidence submitted to prove class 
membership,” a step necessary to protect a defendant’s due process 
rights.133 The court disagreed, holding that a defendant’s due process 
rights are already protected by a “careful and balanced” application of 
Rule 23.134 
B. Rule 4(k)(1)(A) 
The defendants in Mussat argued that allowing the unnamed 
plaintiffs’ claims to go forward would be inconsistent with Rule 
 
128. Sanchez v. Launch Tech. Workforce Sols., L.L.C., 297 F. Supp. 3d 1360, 
1366 (N.D. Ga. 2018). 
129. Mussat, 953 F.3d at 448. 
130. Id. 
131. Brief of Amicus Curiae American Association for Justice, supra note 127, 
at 16, 17 (“To be certified as a class action under Rule 23 . . . a ‘suit must 
satisfy due process procedural safeguards that do not exist in mass tort 
actions.’ These include Rule 23’s requirements of ‘numerosity, commonality, 
typicality, adequacy of representation, predominance and superiority.’” 
(internal citations omitted) (quoting Knotts v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 346 F. 
Supp. 3d 1310, 1333 (D. Minn. 2018))). 
132. 795 F.3d 654, 657 (7th Cir. 2015). 
133. Id. at 669. 
134. Id. at 672. 
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4(k)(1)(A).135 That rule provides that “[s]erving a summons or filing a 
waiver of service establishes personal jurisdiction over a defendant who 
is subject to the jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction in the 
state where the district court is located.”136 The argument is that 
because out-of-state unnamed class members could not bring their 
claims in a court of general jurisdiction in the state, they may not do 
so in federal court.137 As Mussat properly noted, and as described 
above,138 Rule 4(k)(1)(A) does allow federal courts to exercise personal 
jurisdiction over defendants in some cases.139 But that is not to say that 
Rule 4(k)(1)(A) limits the jurisdiction of federal courts in every case. 
There are other scenarios under Rule 4 in which a federal court may 
have jurisdiction even if a state court of general jurisdiction where the 
federal court is located does not.140 Even assuming that Rule 4(k)(1)(A) 
limits the jurisdiction of federal courts in every case, a federal court 
would still not need personal jurisdiction over an absent class member 
under the non-party rule because they are not parties to the litigation.141 
C. The Rules Enabling Act 
Another common objection to the non-party approach is that it 
violates the Rules Enabling Act.142 The Rules Enabling Act provides 
that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure cannot “abridge, enlarge or 
modify any substantive right.”143 The argument is that if unnamed 
plaintiffs are not parties, defendants cannot challenge their claims for 
lack of personal jurisdiction—claims for which they may be liable—
therefore depriving the defendant of a substantive right.144 The first 
issue with this defense is that Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 4 and 23 
do not violate the Rules Enabling Act. 
 
135. Mussat, 953 F.3d at 447. 
136. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A). 
137. Mussat, 953 F.3d at 445. 
138. See supra pp. 1129–33. 
139. Mussat, 953 F.3d at 448 (“It is true that, with certain exceptions, a federal 
district court has personal jurisdiction only over a party who would be 
subject to the jurisdiction of the state court where the federal district court 
is located.”). 
140. See supra pp. 1129–33. 
141. See, e.g., Mussat, 953 F.3d at 447. 
142. Brief of Washington Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Appellees, Urging Affirmance at 22, Mussat, 953 F.3d 441 (No. 19-1204), 
2019 WL 1883613. 
143. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2018). 
144. Brief of Washington Legal Foundation, supra note 142, at 22–24. 
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In Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance 
Co., the Supreme Court interpreted the Rules Enabling Act as a 
limitation [that] means that the Rule must “really regulat[e] 
procedure—the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties 
recognized by substantive law and for justly administering 
remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of them.” The test 
is not whether the Rule affects a litigant’s substantive rights; 
most procedural rules do. What matters is what the Rule itself 
regulates: If it governs only “the manner and the means” by which 
the litigants’ rights are “enforced,” it is valid; if it alters “the rules 
of decision by which [the] court will adjudicate [those] rights,” it 
is not.145 
The Court went on to state that, like Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure 18, 20, and 42(a), Rule 23 is procedural because it “merely 
enables a federal court to adjudicate claims of multiple parties at 
once . . . . And like traditional joinder, it leaves the parties’ legal rights 
and duties intact and the rules of decision unchanged.”146 Like Rule 23, 
personal jurisdiction in federal courts is also procedural and “a proper 
subject of rulemaking.”147 Rule 4 addresses when a federal court may 
exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant, and it only addresses 
the methods and manner by which a federal court may do so. Therefore, 
because both Rule 23 and Rule 4 are purely procedural rules under the 
Shady Grove test, they do not violate the Rules Enabling Act. 
D. Federal Rule 82   
Another commonly asserted defense is that the non-party approach 
violates Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 82.148 Rule 82 provides that 
“[t]hese rules do not extend or limit the jurisdiction of the district courts 
or the venue of actions in those courts.”149 The argument is that by 
classifying unnamed plaintiffs as non-parties, Rule 23 creates personal 
jurisdiction in situations where it otherwise would not exist and thus 
 
145. 559 U.S. 393, 407 (2010) (citations omitted) (first quoting Sibbach v. Wilson 
& Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941); then quoting Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. 
Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 445 (1946); and then quoting id. at 446). 
146. Id. at 408. 
147. See Reply Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant Florence Mussat, M.D., S.C. at 24, 
Mussat, 953 F.3d 441 (No. 19-1204), 2019 WL 2090500. 
148. Bexis, The Latest on Personal Jurisdiction and Class Actions, Drug & 
Device Law (Oct. 21, 2019), https://www.druganddevicelawblog.com/ 
2019/10/the-latest-on-personal-jurisdiction-and-class-actions.html [https:// 
perma.cc/6VE5-9K6N]. 
149. Fed. R. Civ. P. 82. 
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expands jurisdiction.150 For example, if absent class member X could 
not sue defendant Y in federal court in an individual suit, a case 
proceeding through Rule 23 cannot create personal jurisdiction because 
Rule 82 forbids it, or so the argument goes.151 But this argument falls 
short because Rule 82 was not intended to apply to personal 
jurisdiction. The use of the word “jurisdiction” in Rule 82 refers only 
to subject matter jurisdiction.152 This is especially apparent when 
examining the Advisory Committee’s notes to Rule 82, which mention 
that if the rule included “personal or quasi-in rem jurisdiction” it would 
be a “flat lie.”153 Additionally, defining “jurisdiction” in Rule 82 
narrowly to mean subject matter jurisdiction is consistent with the 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the rule.154 
Lastly, this argument assumes that federal courts lack personal 
jurisdiction over claims by out-of-state plaintiffs in the first place. If 
there is a case before a federal court in which the Fifth Amendment 
applies for personal jurisdiction, the out-of-forum status of a plaintiff is 
irrelevant because the proper inquiry involves nationwide, not in-state, 
contacts, and therefore the defendant would be subject to the 
jurisdiction of any federal court, regardless of the state in which it 
sits.155 While an exercise of jurisdiction over an out-of-state plaintiff’s 
claims seems like an expansion if a court can do so only pursuant to 
Rule 4(k)(1)(A), again, under the non-party approach, federal courts 
do not need jurisdiction over absent class members at all because they 
are not parties.156 
E. Abusive Forum Shopping and Principles of Federalism 
In its amicus brief in Mussat, the United States Chamber of 
Commerce argued that the non-party rule would promote “abusive 
 
150. Bexis, supra note 148. 
151. Id. 
152. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 82 advisory committee’s notes; Corrected Brief of 
Plaintiffs-Appellees at 34, Molock v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc., 952 F.3d 
293 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (No. 18-7162), 2019 WL 1469051. 
153. Fed. R. Civ. P. 82 advisory committee’s notes. 
154. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 613 (1997) (“[R]ules 
shall not be construed to extend . . . the subject-matter jurisdiction of the 
United States district courts.”) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 82); see also 
Mississippi Pub. Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 445 (1946) (“Rule 82 
must be construed . . . as referring to venue and jurisdiction of the subject 
matter of the district courts . . . .”). 
155. See supra pp. 1129–33. 
156. Mussat v. IQVIA, Inc., 953 F.3d 441, 447 (7th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 
S. Ct. 1126 (2021). 
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forum shopping” and “violate[] basic principles of federalism.”157 The 
federalism argument is that lawsuits would be allowed to go forward in 
forums that have no legitimate interest in the outcome of a case because 
one named plaintiff with a connection to the forum could represent 
thousands of class members who have no connection whatsoever.158 As 
support, the Chamber cited Braver v. Northstar Alarm Services, 
L.L.C., in which a federal district court rejected the application of BMS 
to a class action in Oklahoma.159 In Braver, a single Oklahoma resident 
was the named plaintiff representing a class of 239,630 people from all 
across the country.160 The Chamber argued that even if the “class 
members [were] proportionally distributed across the country, then 
almost 99% of the claims have no connection to the forum.”161 
First, this argument assumes that the Fourteenth Amendment 
applies for personal jurisdiction in all cases in federal court. This is a 
necessary, and incorrect, assumption because if there is a case in federal 
court where the Fifth Amendment controls the personal jurisdiction 
analysis, the connection needed is to the nation, not a particular state.162 
Second, even assuming the Fourteenth Amendment does apply for 
personal jurisdiction purposes, the case is still in federal court, and 
therefore the federalism concerns that supported the Court’s decision 
in BMS are not present.163 Surely a federal court has an interest in the 
adjudication of controversies properly before it under diversity or 
federal question jurisdiction. 
 
157. Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States as Amicus Curiae 
in Support of Defendant-Appellee at 34, Mussat, 953 F.3d 441 (No. 19-1204), 
2019 WL 1883614. 
158. Id. at 31–32. 
159. 329 F.R.D. 320, 326 (W.D. Okla. 2018). 
160. Id. 
161. Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, supra note 157, at 
34. 
162. See supra notes 54–56 and accompanying text. 
163. Sanchez v. Launch Tech. Workforce Sols., L.L.C., 297 F. Supp. 3d 1360, 
1367 (N.D. Ga. 2018). The court explained: 
In this case, federalism concerns do not apply. Bristol-Myers is 
about limiting a state court’s jurisdiction when it tried to reach out-
of-state defendants on behalf of out-of-state plaintiffs in a mass 
action suit. That scenario is inapplicable to nationwide class actions 
in federal court . . . . [A] nationwide class action in federal court is 
not about a state’s overreaching, but rather relates to the judicial 
system’s handling of mass claims involving numerous . . . parties. 
 Id. (quoting Chinese-Manufactured Drywall Prods. Liab. Litig., 2017 WL 
5971622, at *20 (E.D. La. Nov. 30, 2017)). 
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Under the non-party rule, the lawyers representing the plaintiff 
class would simply need to file the lawsuit in the state where the named 
representative resides or where they were injured to satisfy personal 
jurisdiction requirements (or a state where their injury had some 
connection to the forum). This type of forum shopping is no different 
than the forum shopping the Supreme Court permitted in Keeton v. 
Hustler Magazine, Inc.164 In Keeton, the Court allowed a libel claim 
against a nationwide magazine distributor in a forum state selected 
because of its “unusually long statute of limitations.”165 The Court 
permitted this type of forum shopping, referring to it as “no different 
from the litigation strategy of countless plaintiffs who seek a forum with 
favorable substantive or procedural rules or sympathetic local popu–
lations.”166 
F. The Supreme Court Has Already Rejected the                            
Non-Party Rule in Shutts 
Some have argued that the Supreme Court has already rejected the 
non-party approach to personal jurisdiction in class actions.167 This 
argument invokes Phillips Petroleum Co v. Shutts.168 In Shutts, one of 
many issues before the Court was whether a state may exercise personal 
jurisdiction over the claims of unnamed plaintiffs in class actions, even 
though those plaintiffs do not possess the minimum contacts within the 
forum normally required for personal jurisdiction to exist.169 The class 
consisted of 28,000 members, 97% of whom had no connection to 
Kansas, the state in which the action was brought.170 The Court ulti–
mately held that it had personal jurisdiction over unnamed plaintiffs’ 
claims despite the absence of minimum contacts.171 
Opponents of the non-party theory construe Shutts to stand for the 
notion that unnamed plaintiffs must be parties for the purpose of 
personal jurisdiction because the Court stated that unnamed plaintiffs 
were “entitled to some protection from the jurisdiction of a forum State 
 
164. 465 U.S. 770 (1984). 
165. See id. at 773–75. See also Note, Forum Shopping Reconsidered, 103 Harv. 
L. Rev. 1677, 1682 (1990). 
166. Keeton, 465 U.S. at 779. 
167. See, e.g., J. Gordon Cooney, Brian Ercole, Ezra Church & Jospeh Fay, 
Applying BMS to Federal Class Actions: Due Process Matters, Law 360 
(Jan. 12, 2018, 11:45 AM), https://www.morganlewis.com/-/media/files/ 
publication/outside-publication/article/2018/applying-bms-to-federal-class 
-actions-12jan18.ashx [https://perma.cc/2UNR-9ZLF]. 
168. 472 U.S. 797 (1985). 
169. Id. at 811. 
170. Id. at 801, 815. 
171. Id. at 811. 
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which seeks to adjudicate their claims.”172 The problem with this 
argument is that the Shutts Court focused primarily on the due process 
rights of the unnamed plaintiffs, not the defendants.173 As the Court 
explained, the power of a state to exercise jurisdiction over out-of-state 
plaintiffs is different from its power to exercise jurisdiction over out-of-
state defendants.174 In BMS, the Court already rejected the application 
of Shutts, stating that it has no application with regard to the due 
process rights of defendants.175 Therefore, the reliance on Shutts to 
determine the party status of unnamed plaintiffs to exercise personal 
jurisdiction over a defendant is misplaced. 
Conclusion 
The Court’s decision in Shady Grove managed to slip under the 
media’s radar for the most part.176 While excusable because the case 
involved a complex procedural issue, the impact the case had on class 
actions deserved far more attention than it received.177 The Court 
essentially saved the federal class action from destruction by holding 
that Rule 23 preempts state class-action statutes in federal diversity 
cases.178 Had the Court ruled differently, the class-action device would 
have been severely undermined if not completely crushed.179 We are at 
a similar crossroad currently. If BMS were to extend to unnamed 
plaintiffs in class actions, the effect would be catastrophic. The non-
party approach offers a simple and sensible solution: Absent class 
 
172. Id. (emphasis added). 
173. Id. 
174. Id. at 808–09. The Court wrote: 
The burdens placed by a State upon an absent class-action plaintiff 
are not of the same order or magnitude as those it places upon an 
absent defendant. . . .  
. . . . 
In sharp contrast to the predicament of a defendant haled into an 
out-of-state forum, the plaintiffs in this suit were not haled 
anywhere to defend themselves upon pain of a default judgment. 
Id. at 808. 
175. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1783 (2017) 
(“Since Shutts concerned the due process rights of plaintiffs, it has no 
bearing on the question presented here.”). 
176. Linda S. Mullenix, Federal Class Actions: A Near-Death Experience in a 
Shady Grove, 79 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 448, 448 (2011). 
177. Id. at 448–49. 
178. Id. at 448. 
179. Id. at 449. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 3·2021 
23 and Me 
1146 
members are not parties for personal jurisdiction purposes and therefore 
out-of-state status is irrelevant. By adopting this rule, BMS’s impact 
on class actions would be greatly diminished. While it is true that BMS 
still likely applies to the named plaintiffs in class actions, the attorneys 
representing the plaintiff class can easily navigate around this by filing 
in a federal court where the named representative was injured or 
affected. 
There already exist too many barriers preventing claimants, 
especially the indigent, from vindicating their rights in court.180 If BMS 
is held to apply to class actions, the uphill battle plaintiffs face in 
bringing claims against corporations would become even steeper. Now 
that federal appellate courts have begun to hear cases involving the 
issue,181 the Supreme Court will presumably have an opportunity to 
weigh in. Until then, even with the Seventh Circuit’s ruling in favor of 
the non-party rule,182 BMS at the very least will continue to make 




180. Levick, supra note 73. 
181. See e.g., Molock v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc., 952 F.3d 293, 296 (D.C. 
Cir. 2020); Mussat v. IQVIA, Inc., 953 F.3d 441, 443 (7th Cir. 2020), cert. 
denied, 141 S. Ct. 1126 (2021). 
182. Mussat, 953 F.3d at 443. 
183. Wilf-Townsend, supra note 1, at 226. 
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